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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A VILLAGE OF NORTH INDIA*

MORRIS E. OPLER

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Since 1947 a group of students and associates and I have been gathering data concerning a village of north central India in the Jaunpur district of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Our interest has been in making as many-sided and comprehensive a study as possible and in investigating all aspects of the culture — social, religious, and economic. Naturally, because India is a country that has declared its determination to raise its standard of living and has worked out careful plans to this end, we have been more than a little interested in changes in economy and technology and in any related shifts in social organization and general outlook.**

In this village of a little more than 1000 acres with a population of about 2100 people, farming has long been and continues to be the economic base. In fact the economy of the village is today more completely agricultural than used to be the case. Rising population, high prices for food grains during the war, the "grow more food" campaign since independence, and the better connections with the outside markets which make the raising of cash crops more attractive are some of the factors involved in the intensified agricultural effort. In order to put more land under cultivation some common pasture land of the village has been divided up and put under the plow, mango groves have been sacrificed, alkaline land has been reclaimed, and irrigation tanks have been filled in and sown to crops.

Most of these steps to augment agricultural land are of questionable merit. The reclamation of the alkaline land is the one clear gain. The loss of the tanks is compensated for in part by the digging of additional wells, but the tanks yielded fish which somewhat enriched the diet. The conversion of pasture land to cul-

* A first draft of this paper was read at the meeting of the Columbia Seminar on the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas, April 17, 1956.

** Much of our inquiry into technological change and its correlates in this village has been sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, through two successive long-term grants.

tivation brings its problems, too. It has necessitated a reduction in the number of milk animals, and therefore milk and clarified butter are scarce and expensive in the village today. The cows and female water buffaloes which have had to go were sources of manure, and so the fertility of the soil has been adversely affected. The destruction of trees in an area of erosion and seasonal flood is also a questionable practice. The leaves and cullings from the wooded areas and mango groves are a source of fuel. The other source is cattle dung, so badly needed for fertilizing the fields. Any squandering of timber resources means that a greater percentage of animal dung must be used for fuel instead of for fertilizer. Much of the reclaimed land has been redeemed by the Nonia, a caste group known for its skill in earthworking. This has to some degree spread the ownership of the land in a community in which all the land was once claimed by a Kshattriya group, locally called Thakurs.

Though there has been an increase in the amount of land brought under cultivation, there probably has been little change in yield per acre. The villagers themselves think that the yield is less per land unit, though this may just be a reflection of the usual sentimental overestimation of how things were in "the good old days." At any rate there has not been sufficient improvement in the technology and methods of cultivation to lead to an expectation of significantly higher yields. An increasing number of metal plows are being used, but the standard agricultural implement is still the metal-tipped wooden plow. Even where the metal *meston* or *waugh* plows are utilized, it is usually only to break and turn the ground initially. Metal plows are considered too heavy for bullocks to pull constantly; the village farmer argues that he would require extremely large, powerful, expensive bullocks and would have high fodder costs if he were to use the metal plow throughout his agricultural operations.

The conditions of irrigation have not changed markedly. The growth in the number of wells and the reduction in the number of tanks have not resulted in increasing the amount of irrigated land to any significant extent. Some better varieties of plants are now sown. This is particularly true of sugar cane, rice, and wheat. At least two improved strains of barley, another staple crop, have been rejected by the farmers on the grounds that they yielded no more than the local variety and were harder to grind. In re-

cent years there has been an adjustment in the percentage of land given over to different crops. More acreage has been put into sugar cane, wheat, and oil seeds, products for which there is a demand in the market. More attention is being given to relatively new crops, too. Because of the generous yield per unit of land, the growing of potatoes has become increasingly popular. Onions, too, are grown on a much larger scale. New types of fertilizer have entered the scene as well. Ammonium sulphate is used by some of the more prosperous and progressive farmers. Pressed oil seed cakes, some types of which were considered waste only a few years ago, are now recognized as aids in replenishing the fertility of the soil. But commercial fertilizer and oil seed cakes are too expensive for the average cultivator, who relies upon the waste from his kitchen and cattle compound and the deposits of night soil in his fields. There has been little change in methods of harvesting, threshing and processing, storing, and marketing the crops. It is obvious that agricultural practices have undergone no revolution in this village.

The main technological innovations related to agriculture which have appeared so far are to be found in the processing of crops rather than in their production. A mechanical chaff cutter has superseded the hand chopper, and there are now more than 20 of them in the village. Sugar cane pressers with iron rollers have entirely eliminated the cumbersome stone models. A more efficient unit for making brown sugar from the sugar cane juice is now being introduced. To the economic detriment of the Telis, the members of the oil presser caste, a good deal of the pressing of the oil seeds is now done by a kerosene-burning, power-driven machine at the nearest market town.

The reasons for the conservatism and reluctance to experiment in agricultural practices are not hard to find. The land ownership pattern affords a good clue. Of the 196 families of the village which own any land at all, 70 own less than one acre. Fifty-two families own between one and two acres. Twenty-five more possess between three and four acres. Indian agricultural experts have taken the view that anything less than six and one-quarter acres is likely to be an uneconomical holding. There are only 36 families or households in this village whose holdings exceed this figure. And it must be remembered that most of these families are extended families, in which the legal title to the land is

shared by a number of persons and the holding may be divided if any disagreement occurs and a demand for separation takes place. No family has claim to more than 30 acres of land and only four own more than 20 acres. These figures, it must be remembered, do not refer to cultivated and arable land alone, but to ownership of land of all grades and kinds and to land in fallow as well.

It must further be kept in mind that the land of any family is seldom in one piece or even all in one section of the village. The rule of inheritance of land by all sons equally and the feeling that the possession of scattered plots is an insurance against total destruction of one's crops by pests or natural calamities mainly account for this fragmentation. As a result the holdings of these 196 families are divided into over 5000 plots, some of them so small that they could not even be used for house sites. There may have been a time when it was an advantage to the cultivator to have low, moist lands in the north of the village for rice cultivation and land in the south more suitable for the production of wheat and barley, but the difficulties of attempting to manage so many tiny plots economically has long since cancelled out any benefit. So small and so scattered are the villager's land holdings and so meager and dubious are his profits that he is in no mood to invest in relatively costly implements or to take what he considers to be any unnecessary risk.

The reduction of pasture land has affected the social organization and caste constitution of the village to some degree. It has forced some of the Ahirs, the cattle-herding caste, out of the village. Even now the Ahirs are the fourth largest caste of the village in numbers, but they would very likely be even more numerous and more powerful today if the pressure on land had not been so great. And since the Ahirs are a virile, assertive, upward-mobile group, this would have given village politics a somewhat different complexion.

Antagonism and competition between herdsmen and farmers are as true of India as of other parts of the world. The scarcity of grazing land has consequently increased the friction between the Ahirs and other castes; the latter are forever charging that the Ahirs allow their cattle to trample and forage in their fields.

Other changes, some unconnected with agriculture, have also had their impact on the social life of the village. The local caste

of cotton carders and weavers struggled for long years to maintain themselves — first against British mill goods and then against Indian manufacturers. When Bombay became the textile center and better transportation facilities not only made it possible for factory piece goods to come to the market town but for these people to travel easily and quickly to Bombay, they adjusted as best they could to the inevitable. The men have sought and found employment in Bombay. They leave their wives in the village and return on leave or vacation one or two months a year.

Another caste whose position in the village is threatened by technological innovation is the Kahar, or water carriers. Upper-caste women of the village are in *parda* or seclusion and seldom leave the walls and courtyards of their homes. Until recently all water for bathing, cooking, and drinking has had to be brought from wells outside the homes by the more lowly Kahars. But now there are a fairly large number of hand pumps installed in the village, most of them in the courtyards of the more prosperous landowners. The installation of even more pumps was planned; but it was learned that a water line with several taps was to be run to the village from a government tube well in a neighboring village, and the thrifty villagers are now using these facilities.

The prospects of another artisan group, the potters, have also felt the force of the factory. The growing metal industry has flooded the market with inexpensive pots and dishes, something that only the very wealthy could afford in the past, and the demand for earthenware has dropped sharply.

Still other artisan groups have been jeopardized by the combination of better transportation facilities and mass-produced goods. Factory-made shoes have all but eliminated the Mochi, or local cobbler, from the vicinity. The Sonar, or gold and silver-smith, has gone to the market town to work for a wage in a concern which hires a number of goldsmiths as workers. The Lohar, or carpenter-smith, is not called upon for so many services either. Many of the small tools which he used to make for the villagers now come from the factories of England, Germany, or from India's Tata firm. As a result of these trends the village artisan who has not been able to obtain some land or agricultural labor to supplement his income, or who has not been able to find employment outside the village, has been in a very precarious position indeed.

Yet in spite of the rising population, the increasing pressure on the land, the set-back to herding, and the deterioration of the artisans' prospects, the village is fairly prosperous today in terms of Indian standards. It is enjoying a building boom right now, and a number of pakka houses — that is, houses constructed of kiln-baked brick, with metal beams and tiled roofs — have lately been constructed. Moreover, the people are, on the whole, better fed and dressed than in the past, and items which were strictly in the luxury class are becoming more and more common — such things as cycles, wrist watches, tea, and the like. How is this possible?

The answer seems to be outside employment, especially employment in the urban, mining, and industrial centers. When we completed a census of the village not long ago, we discovered that approximately 100 members of the community were working outside of it at the time. Approximately half of them were working in Bombay and Calcutta, two major cities at the opposite sides of the country. They constitute about 15 per cent of the adult male population of the village. Most of them remit earnings to their families in the village. Some send substantial amounts. Some send almost all they earn and live on a bare minimum at the locality of employment, often under squalid conditions.

The interesting point is that the great majority of these workers have no intention of remaining away from the village for a very long period. They are not seeking permanent employment in the city. They are relieving family needs and restoring family finances. They will return and their places, so to speak, will be taken by other villagers. If this pattern is common and widespread, and there is some evidence to indicate that it is, one might say that at this time many Indian villages are almost a parasitic growth on the urban and industrial centers, utilizing them for the means to insure their own stability and survival.

This balance can probably be maintained for some years yet, but it is ultimately doomed. The urban populations are growing too, and unless industry expands at a rapid rate for a long time, at some point a stable, trained, urban labor force will be achieved. Then there will be less and less room and opportunity in industry for the shifting, rural-oriented village aspirant. There will be more and more competition, too, for other kinds of posi-

tions that villagers fill in the cities. This means of disguising its uneven economy, this export of its surplus workers, may then no longer be open to the village.

The present answer of the Indian government to this comparatively bleak outlook is, as far as the village is concerned, two-fold. There is an interest, first, in rationalizing agriculture. And there are plans to establish small-scale industries in the rural areas, so that those who do not own land or who do not have an agricultural background will not be entirely dependent on the large urban centers.

By now it is fairly clear to Indian leaders that the advice of extension workers and demonstrations of improved implements to farmers will go only so far until land consolidation takes place, until a farmer's land holdings are concentrated in such a way that he can work and manage them economically. Enabling legislation has already been passed in Uttar Pradesh, and land consolidation is already going on there experimentally. It is hoped that once land consolidation is achieved, economic gains will result that will warrant investment in better tools and methods.

To reduce dependence on agriculture alone in the rural regions and to offer alternate and substitute employment to villagers, the second five-year plan envisages the establishment of small-scale industries. At the same time rural electrification will be promoted, for electricity is thought of as the main motive power in forwarding these plans. For instance, it is expected that a thermal station located at Mau in the Azamgarh district will supply electricity for the small industries of the region we have been discussing. The products to be manufactured in any rural locality will depend on the availability of raw materials and the nature of the accessible markets. Transportation needs are to be met simultaneously. For instance, the second five-year plan calls for the building of a bridge over the Gumti River, a tributary of the Ganges, which will link the village we have described with the important Banaras market. Whether the small-scale industries now contemplated will be able to compete with the products of the great industrial centers within India and abroad and can stabilize the economy and population pattern of the rural sections remains to be seen. Certainly they will have one great advantage; they will have the support and protection of the government, at least during their early phase.

CULTURE CONTACT AND CULTURE CONFLICT IN WESTERN NEW GUINEA

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In the past half-century, Dutch interest in and administrative control over Western New Guinea has greatly increased. This was the one portion of the former Netherlands East Indies which was not formally transferred to the independent Indonesian Republic in December 1949, and the new Dutch concern for their West New Guinea possession should be seen against the background of the growing acrimony between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the question as to which of the two countries is entitled to govern West New Guinea, and of the problem of the whole Dutch development effort in this part of the world (van der Kroef 1958, A, B). Because of this, the accultural process now under way in West New Guinea has aroused new interest among various Dutch scholars and administrators, whose research findings are of more than passing interest. The following pages will seek to compare two Dutch case studies of the culture contact process in West New Guinea, and so will afford a connection with an earlier published analysis of accultural phenomena in this area (van der Kroef 1957).

I

Our first concern is with the culture of the 13,000 odd Muju, in the subdistrict of the same name in the extreme Southeast corner of Netherlands West New Guinea, adjacent to the boundary of Australian East New Guinea.¹ Muju country is crossed by rivers and the terrain forms a transition from coastal marshes to the mountainous interior with its thick tropical rain forest. The Muju are organized in patrilineal lineages, but the polygynous family, consisting of husband, one or more wives, and their natural, adopted or purchased children is the focal point of the social process. Production of food, ownership of land, and housing are family centered, though several families may live together under the same roof (e.g. father and married son, or two married brothers). Marriage is patrilocal and traditionally

¹Data on Muju culture in this section are summarized from the dissertation by Schoorl (1957).

of the cross-cousin variety, though a fixed connubial pattern is declining. A traditional settlement consisted of a handful of widely scattered family dwellings constructed on tall tree trunks or stilts, usually within the sacred-territorial units of the lineage. There are no formal lineage leaders. Local distinctions are based on age, wealth and proficiency in exploiting the intricate network of reciprocity with its possibilities of trade and vengeance. The term *kajepak* denotes the adult male (30 years and over), who has been initiated in the sacred rites, is relatively wealthy, and is usually married. A *kajepak* who is much feared because his magical powers or his wealth have enabled him to wreak bloody vengeance on a number of occasions, is called *kononkot*, and is the nearest thing to a Muju elite. The contrast with the *kajepak* is not only formed by those in lesser age groups (e.g. the *tana* or children below 16 years, or the *kakewet* and *koju*, young men and women respectively between 16 and 20), but especially by those without any wealth, such as youths or young men whose parents are dead and who face difficulties in bringing together the necessary bride price. In the family the father stands in a strong position toward his offspring. Sons learn the meaning of the myths and rituals from their father, and without the father's help marriage is difficult. Adoption and purchase of children are then a means by which orphans, who are a potential economic asset to any family unit, can be integrated in society through the family mechanism.

The significance of the bride price is but an aspect of what is perhaps the fundamental theme of Muju culture: the pre-occupation with accumulating objects of value through a ceaseless searching for commercial relations, in which marriage, acquisition of new relatives, and even the central religious ceremony, the pig feast (*awonbon* or *atatbon*), all play important roles. Traditionally the most important value object is the *ot*, a cowrie shell of certain size and appearance, which is believed to be of sacred origin and which serves as a medium of exchange for a vast range of socio-economic transactions, including the bride price, the purchase of food (especially of pork), of implements, in the payment of compensation, and so on. The significance of marriage, with its payment of the bride price in *ot* (a portion of the bride price is refunded also in *ot* by the bride's family), or the value of an additional wife in the family, who can con-

tribute to the production of food, especially of pork, are self evident. The wider the range of relations, both in the inter-familial and in the inter-lineage sense, the greater is the range of potential trading partners, of sources of support in the collection of debts, and of opportunities to be invited to a pig feast with its marketing facilities.

Muju economic behavior then, is essentially capitalistic. The observation of Pospisil regarding the economy of the Kapauku, who live in the Northwestern part of Dutch New Guinea near the Geelvink Bay, that "Individualism is more pronounced in this culture than it is even in the West," applies *pari passu* also to the Muju (Pospisil 1956: 13). The yield of hunting (wild pigs, cassuaries, leguanos), of fishing, and of agriculture in cleared forest plots (sago, beetroots, fruits) is individually (i.e. familially) controlled, and all land is individually owned, the lineage as a whole having no rights in it. A father's legacy usually passes to his sons.

The cultivation of pigs is of major importance, since pork is a highly appreciated food and a means with which to obtain *ot*. *Awonbon* and *atatbon*, the pig feasts of the Muju, are occasions to sell pigs; cash payment (in the form of *ot*), for the pork is customary at the *atabon*, the larger and more elaborate of the two pig feasts. Invitations to relatives to attend a pig feast attract visitors from afar with goods to sell and exchange, — not only pork and other foods, but also hunting and fishing implements, clothing and ornaments. Thus virtually every Muju family raises pigs. This job is typically entrusted to women. Pigs are not confined in pens, but are allowed to roam freely around the house and in the woods. Raising methods, e.g. regular feeding, are aimed at keeping the pigs tame and bound to their caretaker (Muju women nurse the small pigs). The freerunning pigs are frequently a source of contention in the Muju community because they destroy food crops in the forest plots. Moreover, because of their value they exacerbate the numerous debtor-creditor relationships. The great mobility of the Muju, who may travel 50 to 60 miles to trade is, as Schoorl emphasizes, the reflection of his ceaseless accumulation of *ot*, pork, tobacco, hunting and fishing gear and other objects of value.

This economic individualism is related also to the strong

tendency in Muju culture to settle all quarrels and disagreements by individual action. Whether it concerns a problem involving women (e.g. pre-marital relations are prohibited, for one fears for the loss of the bride price), disputes over inheritance or debts, (relatives are expected to pay a deceased's debts), or a death in the family (few deaths are regarded as natural, most are believed to be caused by the deleterious magic of some enemy), the Muju, as Schoorl points out, must himself balance the scales of justice. The vengeance pattern is, therefore, prominent in this society, and murder (also carried out by hiring an assassin, or entrusting the job to a relative), threats to murder, punitive magic and enforced payment of compensation are common. Cannibalism, i.e. consumption of the flesh of the victim who was the object of one's vengeance, is regarded as the satisfactory culmination of revenge.

Finally a word should be said about Muju religion. Essentially animistic, Muju religion revolves around a number of semi-personified supernatural forces, of which *Komot*, whose real appearance is unknown but who is compared to the wind, and who is creator of sun, animals, and earth, and *Tataman*, who disposes over trees and other vegetation, are the most significant. Of special importance is *Kamberap*, the ancestral hero, from whom emanated not only the common tame pig, but also the sacred pig (*jawarawon*). During an *atatbon* a pig, representing *jawarawon*, is ceremoniously eaten by men only, and special magical properties are associated with this pork.² The consumption of *jawarawon* during an *atatbon* also marks the initiation of younger age classes into full manhood. During the *jawarawon* ceremony it is the father's task to inform his sons of the mysteries, the further details of which are irrelevant here.

The first Western contact with the Muju was made by a Dutch military expedition between 1907 and 1915. In the following decade the commercial value of birds-of-paradise attracted hunters of many nationalities (e.g. Australians, Chinese, Indonesians) to the Muju country. In 1927 the Dutch government established the Tanah Merah concentration camp for Indonesian nationalists and Communists in the region of the upper Digul

² On the religious and socio-economic significance of pig cultivation in Muju and adjacent culture areas see Den Haan 1955.

river. Increasingly the Muju, in his role as guide to the hunters or as servant of the Tanah Merah authority, came in touch with the outside world. Roman Catholic missionaries traversed the area and early in the thirties a beginning was made with the construction of mission schools. In 1935 the Dutch government established a police and administrative post, and the next year an Indonesian "government assistant" (*bestuursassistent*) regularly represented the state authority at this post. Military and police patrols now became more frequent. Increasing concern with Muju institutions, and the reactions this brought forth, necessitated more complete administrative apparatus, but it was not until 1955 that the Muju area became a separate subdistrict with its own Dutch administrative head (*controleur*). By this time, and notwithstanding the vicissitudes of World War II, mission activity had become centered around three churches, some 60 primary schools, a post of nuns with a separate girls' boarding school, and four missionaries who regularly travel through the area and supervise the schools. About half of the mission schools are subsidized by the Netherlands government.

Schoorl reveals that with one or two notable exceptions government policy and mission objectives have by and large been in accord as to the changes to be affected in Muju society. These common aims, however, have not always been carried out with consistency of technique, especially from the side of the government, so that forceful and more permissive administrative tactics sometimes succeeded one another with a — for the Muju — bewildering frequency.

Among the chief joint objectives was a complete ecological transformation of Muju society. Whereas the Muju had traditionally lived in widely separated family dwellings in the forest, the government and the mission have insisted, since 1935, on the formation of compact villages in which the inhabitants under administrative supervision regularly participate in common maintenance projects. Though Muju society was wholly unfamiliar with communal leaders, the government, in 1935, appointed the first chiefs and other village executive officers, while in 1955 the first elected village councils came into being. Village formation has at least theoretically been a success. By mid-1956 there were more than 60 such villages, varying in population between

100 and 450 inhabitants. For the civil authorities village formation had obvious advantages, "getting the Muju out of the trees" and into compact settlements facilitated effective supervision and control. But for the mission too, villages were necessary if pastoral work, religious instruction and other school activities were to be carried out and supervised. It was not realized, however, that obliging the Muju to live in villages would lead to frustration and to open violence.

Living in a village presented many problems to the Muju. In the first place moving from his original forest dwelling put a considerable distance between him and his sago plots, fruit trees, hunting and fishing preserve, while getting the necessary new land in or near the new village proved difficult indeed. Secondly, the older Muju preferred their traditional mobility. Thirdly, the pig cultivation was seriously threatened for the missions objected since the free running pigs destroyed school property and gardens which provide missionaries and teachers with food; the government objected on hygienic grounds; and the Muju himself did not favor confining their pigs to pens as would be necessary if he took up residence in the village. Yet the Muju could not abandon pig cultivation altogether in view of the integral part it plays in Muju culture. The result was that in order to raise pigs, the Muju felt it necessary to keep his forest hut. This meant his occasional absence from the village, and — a point of contention with the mission authorities — also tended to keep him out of church and his children out of the mission schools. Finally, having to live in the village deprived the Muju of the possibility of withdrawing from dangerous contacts when he felt threatened by signs of anger from a *Kononkot*.

It cannot be said that the Dutch government was particularly sympathetic to all these objections from the Muju. Since the late thirties, and with varying degrees of severity, the authorities had recourse to the following devices with which to compel the Muju to live in villages: (1) periodic destruction of all Muju forest dwellings by military and police, (2) levying of fines on those who persisted in living outside the villages, (3) if fines could not be paid jailing an individual Muju until his relatives paid the fine, and (4) requiring the Muju to participate in com-

mon village maintenance projects on pains of physical punishment. For a time all pigs in the village were shot down on sight by the police; later, pigs were killed only if they caused damage. There was no consistency in the application of these measures, and, as Schoorl points out, they varied with individual officials. At one point, (in 1951), a subdistrict officer even considered giving the Muju their free choice to live in the villages or not, but serious protests arose from mission authorities, who feared that many Muju and their children would almost certainly disappear into the forest. Since 1955 there appears to be a certain permissiveness in village residence policies. Difficulties with school attendance and with the polygynous marriage form have remained.

The fitful nature of Dutch acculturation policy had one or two other adverse consequences for the Muju. The origin and context of the Western cultural element in the life of the Muju was never adequately explained to him, so that he was thrown on his own resources to provide a rationale for the technical and organizational supremacy of Western culture.³ This was undoubtedly a factor in the subsequent outburst of Messianic expectations (to be discussed below) in the Muju region. That the Muju wanted to know more of the West there can be little question, but the Dutch government tended to follow a paradoxical policy in this respect. It facilitated the penetration of Western money into Muju society, introduced new commodities (also via Chinese stores) such as shoes, clothing, fish hooks, and hatchets, and began to propagate the cultivation of a commercial crop (cacao), while at the same time, in order to prevent further "absenteeism" from the villages, it prohibited the trek of Muju to the nearby city of Merauke with its many "Western attractions" and its opportunity to earn money. Thus the accultural contact situation created significant sources of Muju frustration, and contributed to an unintegrated and uneasy co-existence of new with old cultural elements. The latter condition is well illustrated

³ This condition is by no means unusual in Dutch New Guinea. Another student (Kouwenhoven 1955: 65-66) writes: "We might consider it a major shortcoming that it was never seriously explained to him (i.e. the Nimboran) how the people bringing Government and Christianity came by their enormous technical advantage over indigenous culture. . . . Usually the people were left in the dark and they had to resort to their own — very limited — knowledge to try to find the answer."

in the simultaneous acceptance of the Western while retaining the indigenous pharmacopeia.⁴

It is clear from Schoorl's account, that mission policy in the Muju region frequently tended to exacerbate the disruptive features of cultural change. The mission's ethnocentricity in dealing with Muju customs, — e.g. its demands that the government compel the Muju to abandon polygynous marriage and the use of *ot*, — did not make for integration initially. Moreover, East Indonesian teachers used by the mission in various schools came from ethnic groups that had always been somewhat contemptuous of the Papuans of New Guinea, and a new authoritarianism crept into mission policies which aimed at keeping Muju youth in school as long as possible, probably for fear of cultural "back-sliding." The teacher, the mission school and the younger generation all became so many unintegrated elements in traditional Muju society, aggravating accultural tensions. But perhaps the gravest defect of mission policy was that the nature of mission schooling essentially overlooked the Muju's acquisitiveness sharpened by his new Western contacts. Muju parents encouraged children to go to school, in the hope that with education these children would then be enabled to get the desired Western goods for their parents. A real commitment to Christianity would, in such a materialistic context, be difficult to effect. Becoming a Christian was merely part of that process which enabled an individual to acquire the techniques with which to gather in the riches of the Westerner. Illustrative is the statement of an important participant in the Muju Messianic upheavals. He declared that, had his movement succeeded in bringing the desired Western commodities, the Christian religion would have been cast aside.

From other indications it is clear that traditional religious beliefs were not deeply affected by the missions. Under such circumstances the character of mission educational policy, with its comparative stress on the new religious values and their social implications and their relative depreciation of intellectual skills, becomes open to question. Mission policy was designed to transform the cosmology of the Muju, to "civilize" him before undertaking to teach him the techniques of modern knowledge. Emi-

⁴For an identical condition, culturally even more extensive, of an unintegrated coexistence of diverse culture patterns in a West New Guinea society, see Pouwer (1955: 255-263).

nent Dutch mission spokesmen have generally defended such a policy (Verschueren 1957: 209-237) without always realizing that the traditional materialistic acquisitiveness of the Muju derived a formidable new strength from every manifestation of Western technical and organizational ingenuity in his midst, so that the penetration of a money economy, the opportunities — however limited — to earn wages in Western installations, and the steady trickle of new and useful Western gadgets made immediate and effective contact with one of the principal dynamics of Muju culture: the ceaseless accumulation of valuables. Compared to the speed and efficacy with which this contact was established in the life of the Muju the impact of the cosmological message of Christianity was relatively negligible.

The comparative weakness of the Christianization process is perhaps best exemplified by the persistence of the traditional cosmology in the Muju's explanations of the West's technical superiority. As elsewhere in West New Guinea (Kamma 1954), there is the belief that the present day manifestations of Western technical superiority were once native possessions, but that some catastrophe, caused by nature or man, swept these manifestations away to a distant land, and that those "foreigners" now in possession of these goods have some remote ancestral connection with the contemporary Papuan. Also prevalent among the Muju is the expectation, common to many "cargo cults" of Melanesia, that the ancestors can be supplicated to provide these Western commodities for the present generation (van der Kroef C 1958: 357-364).

The recent Messianic currents in the Muju area constitute something of a culmination of the conflicts arising out of the accultural process and Schoorl gives a detailed account of them. First it must be noted that on several occasions the Muju resorted to force to express his grievances against the Dutch authority. In 1942 an Indonesian policeman was murdered (it had been intended to kill the government assistant), and in 1945 and 1946 bands of Muju attacked government posts. The reasons for these outbursts varied: dissatisfactions over the imposition by the government of *ot* fines, over the rough treatment of Muju prisoners in jail, over the shooting down of pigs, and so on. The attacks were unsuccessful, the murderer of the policeman was caught and in the following years processes of culture change

intensified and the Muju came into increasing contact with the West. Notwithstanding restrictions on Muju migration to the city of Merauke a number of Muju had gone and found work there. The first manifestation of a Muju Messianic movement occurred among these Muju in Merauke, but the movement also acquired followers in the Muju area itself. Toward the close of September 1953, some 20 Muju in Merauke handed to the Dutch resident officer a set of letters and memoranda which related the origin of their movement and set forth their demands. According to these letters one of the Muju in Merauke, named Karoem, had in the course of April 1953 been visited in his sleep by a spirit, and had been shown the way to progress and welfare for all of the people of Southern New Guinea. God himself would make known this future development plan and in the meantime the Muju who participated in the movement would get lessons in the way to establish contact with ancestral spirits, especially the spirits of deceased Americans. In subsequent revelations Karoem was given further details about the new order for his people. Several distinct aspects of these revelations and of the movement, which soon attracted a sizable number of followers, may be touched upon briefly.

First, there is the pronounced materialism in the Messianic expectations. All nations must send money to Merauke, the resident officer of Merauke is requested to facilitate this process and the Dutch government is specifically requested to ask other nations to send "money factories." In the Muju country itself, the spirit informed Karoem, there would one day appear, in a wink, a complete city, with a factory that "makes money," with many shops and a ship. The Muju would also be provided with their own pilots, their own navy, their own bishop, and so on. Another revelation demanded price controls in Merauke (no object might exceed 5 Dutch florins in price), the abolition of the wages tax and of charitable offerings (presumably in church). Secondly, there is an element of sexual continence. Muju bachelors who participated in the movement agreed that they would henceforth abstain from any contact with Indonesian or Muju women, lest the helpful spirits disappear. Later, when the millenium had arrived, they would be provided with American and Australian women, with "large, beautiful bodies." Thirdly, there is the

special role played by America in these expectations. The importance of American spirits has been mentioned. In subsequent revelations Karoem related how Queen Juliana of the Netherlands would transfer her authority over New Guinea to Mariana, the spirit of some dead person in America, and how New Guinea and America would become one. Fourthly, there is the racial discriminatory factor: Indonesians and Eurasians must leave New Guinea, the Dutch newcomers and some of the Chinese may stay, but the Muju will be supreme in his own land. Finally, mention is made of special magical occurrences that signify the coming of the Millenium: the dead have been raised, and coconut trees have been made to march. These are proofs of the validity of the movement. He who joins will share in the bounty, he who refuses will receive a cross behind his name and is marked for death on the day of the Millenium.

Little comment is necessary on these Muju apocalyptic features, most of which (i.e., the sudden appearance of Western goods, the function of ancestors as intermediaries, sexual continence, the preeminent position of America, and the signs that mark the coming of the Millenium) are common enough in other cargo movements of this area (van der Kroef C 1958: 357-364; Kamma 1954). More or less unique is the hostility toward the Eurasians. This minority group has had an unusually difficult position in post-colonial Indonesia and some of them had settled in West New Guinea to find a new life, mainly in small estate agriculture. As such they began to compete with other population groups on the market of Merauke in production of meat and vegetables, a competition which may have contributed to Muju enmity toward them. The attitude toward the Chinese, most of them in retail trade, is more ambiguous; like some Indonesians they may stay, but it is clear that their departure is preferred. Noteworthy is also the position of the movement toward the Dutch missions and civil authority. Leaders of the movement were emphatic in stressing the will of "God the Father" as the guideline of their action; in fact, they declared to young Muju Christians that the Christian religion was good and true. As for the government, the movement's leaders felt that the set of revelations and duties imposed on them by these revelations were "not just superstitions" but were matters of sublime importance,

which they felt they had to communicate to the proper resident authority.

By 1955 Karoem's revelations had travelled up the rivers into the heart of the Muju country. Instruction was being given in village "spirit schools" in order to reach communion with the ancestral dead, sometimes payment of one *ot* was asked for such instruction. Special therapeutic practices now appeared in the movement. In general the movement in the Muju country proper had a less political character than in Merauke, where the ambitions of more sophisticated Muju had enveloped Karoem's expectations.

The government did not act with undue severity. It arrested Karoem and one of the principal promoters of the movement in the up-river country, but for the rest contented itself with keeping the Messianic agitation under surveillance. In the Muju area itself much of the population had adopted a cautious wait-and-see policy, so that the arrest of the movement's leaders did not create a sharp reaction. But Muju millenarianism may well continue to express itself in different forms in the future. An example is not only the growing political consciousness and organizational expertise of Papuans in such urban centers as Merauke, but also the "savings action" undertaken by a group of Muju who worked in mission and government saw mills in 1955. Muju wage earners spontaneously began to save small amounts of their money income, and Schoorl correctly surmises a connection between the millenarian sentiments and this spontaneous saving. The Muju, who had initiated the savings action, when questioned about motives, gave such vague answers as "We want to help our country," "We are still poor," and "We want to regulate our own lives under the Dutch leadership." An awareness of one's inadequacy and a "desire to share in the wealth of the foreigners," as Schoorl puts it, indicate the similarity between the mainsprings of Messianic expectation and the voluntary accumulation of the foreigners' money.

In assessing Dutch acculturation policies in the Muju country, the fundamental defect to be noted is Dutch failure to give adequate recognition to what might be called the cultural focus of the Muju: his continuous need to accumulate traditional valu-

ables in a highly individualistic society.⁵ The gathering of *ot*, pork, implements and other goods is interwoven with the entire fabric of Muju life: it is integrated with the connubium through the function of the bride price, it is the rationale of the pig feast (the only proper occasion for an initiation into full manhood status), it is of fundamental importance in the establishment of the network of relatives (including the polygynous marriage form) and trading partners, and in turn finds expression in the great mobility of the Muju. It is related to the all important activity of the raising of pigs and to the housing pattern.

The impact of Dutch policy was such as to (1) sharpen the already developed acquisitive urges of the Muju by the introduction of novel but useful implements, while at the same time (2) placing obstacles in the way in the accumulation not only of these novel commodities, but also — and in this transition period more importantly — of the traditional valuables. The result was that Dutch policy boxed the Muju in: persistence in his traditional value sphere was made difficult, while means to advance in the new culture context (the technical origins and achievements of which were never adequately explained to him) were not well provided. The mission too, with the laudable intent of first transforming the Muju's cosmology before providing him with the specialized tools of modern knowledge, overlooked the Muju's essentially "secular-materialistic" appreciation of Western education, so that the Christianization process did not deeply influence the Muju's religious beliefs and the socio-economic dynamics of his culture. The Messianic movement was an attempt by the Muju to re-establish his own worth in terms of the largely materialistic context in which Western influence had come to be understood.

II

Some 70 miles southwest from the Muju area one encounters

⁵The specialization and complexity of such an acquisitive orientation of the cultural focus may be more significant in various West New Guinea societies than has hitherto been suspected, suggesting its importance also for the entire accultural processes now being undertaken in this part of the world. Thus the intricate exchange of sacred and profane cloths in the connubium in the Mejbrat culture around Lake Ajamaru, reflected in extensive barter alliances, suggests a similarity with the materialistic cultural focus of the Muju. See on the Mejbrat Pouwer (1957: 295-319).

the Jahray.* Jahray country (population about 7000) is traversed by the same major rivers (the Queen Juliana, Digul, and Mappi), but topographically it experiences more fully the influence of the irregular coastline. The Jahray spends much time in marshes and on the rivers, his favorite manner of settlement is on a strategically located hill between the marshes and the inland wooded areas, with a river close by at the foot of the hill.

Fishing in various ways (including stunning the fish by polluting the water with the poisonous bark of the qomaaq tree), hunting (birds, wild boar), domestic raising of pigs, cultivation of sago, coconut, banana and tobacco for private consumption, are the main aspects of production. Like the Muju the Jahray is extremely mobile, his settlements traditionally are impermanent, and his frequent movement is probably dictated as much by his hunting interests as by the necessity to minimize attacks from his neighbors. A typical traditional Jahray settlement consists of a men's house, in which all adult males reside, and a number of nearly inaccessible women's dwellings constructed on high stilts. Marriage is patrilocal, in the sense that the woman leaves her mother's dwelling and goes to live in her mother-in-law's hut where her husband visits her. In the men's house, which women ordinarily do not enter, each man has his special place near a small open fire in the company of one of his relatives. Married women in the women's houses have their separate fire place too for the preparation of food, but no partitions provide for privacy. As in the case of the Muju polygamy is not unusual. It enhances the man's prestige, provides him with more food, but distinctions are usually made between the head wife and by-wives.

The religio-cultural significance of the men's house in Indonesia and Melanesia has been sufficiently attested to by various students and requires little elaboration here, except to say that the Jahray men's house does not appear to have any particular totemic or other supernatural connotation. Apart from structuring the personality in terms of specific masculine roles it serves primarily to strengthen the informal social bonds between the

*Data in this section on Jahray culture and cultural change are taken from Boelaars (1957).

headhunter-warriors of the community. Undoubtedly the potential social cohesiveness of the men's house has been weakened by the extensive reciprocity pattern (to be discussed below) that governs all interpersonal relations.

Similarly the woman develops a clear image of her role in the company of other women, and the propriety of sex-segregated training is generally accepted. Yet, Boelaars notes, both Jahray men and Jahray women have a common culture ideal, called *ak jamambek* for men and *ak jamambuk* for women. The two terms mean the same thing: to be forceful, full of vitality and zest. It denotes a condition of energetic adjustment to nature and human law, and proficiency in the execution of tasks appropriate to one's role. Unquestionably this concept has connections with the Jahray religious system. Essentially animistic, the Jahray believes himself to be influenced by ancestral spirits (*babai*), one of whom, *Aere*, is a culture hero who taught the Jahray many useful things. But the heart of Jahray religion is the concept of the sun. As in the case of the near neighbors of the Jahray, the Mirind anim, the sun is believed to play a pivotal role in the development of a human life (van Baal 1934: 26). The sun represents *maqati*, a term denoting permanent strength and vitality, a condition deeply longed for by the Jahray. In myths is recounted how the ancestors made the error of refusing the sun-given immortality, and thus death and disease came into the world. Toward the all-powerful sun, which the Jahray addresses as "grandfather," the moon stands as a younger brother or an exchange partner, thus reflecting the all pervading reciprocity that characterizes the Jahray social process. Whether the social reciprocity and its accompanying religious dualism (i.e. sun and moon as each other's older and younger brother) represents an old cosmological and social moiety system can only be surmised.⁷ It would not be impossible; traces of such eroded dualism have been found elsewhere in West New Guinea (see e.g. Galis, 1953: 237).

Although the Jahray is in many respects as individualistic as the Muju in matters of economic production and vengeance, he too, is familiar with a concept of extensive reciprocity (called *amor*) which is designed to strengthen his social status. In

⁷For examples of such a system see van der Kroef (1954: 847-862).

his study Boelaars has analyzed this reciprocity in great detail. The ideal marriage form establishes or deepens an exchange pattern with significant socio-economic consequences. This ideal marriage consists of two brothers who "exchange" their respective sisters (i.e. whose sisters become the wives of two other brothers, who in turn have two sisters that marry with the first two brothers). Through such a marriage an extensive reciprocity system comes into being that involves not only the immediate nuclear families, but their respective *imu* as well. *Imu* is a term given to the extended family, headed by the oldest male, and comprises married sons, married daughters whose husbands have chosen their father-in-law's *imu*, their natural children, and children who have been adopted. The *imu* possesses a certain land area and the members cooperate with and defend one another in all phases of life.

It is, of course, impossible always to conclude an ideal marriage arrangement so that variations may occur, but generally a man hopes to persuade a sister or a brother to marry with a spouse from the family from which he himself is also obtaining his bride; inability to establish such an exchange pattern involves a one-sided presentation of goods and renders imperfect the mutuality principle between newly related families. Lineage and exogamy concepts are undeveloped. One marries someone "who is not of one's family," — an expression which seems to apply not only to *imu* family relations, but also to those families with which, by virtue of a special reciprocity pattern, intermarriage prohibitions are in effect. Moreover, all manner of other considerations influence the ideal marriage pattern. Parental preferences reflecting these other reciprocity patterns in Jahray society, a desire for additional land, "political" considerations which dictate that marriages be concluded with members of a certain settlement with which one has just concluded a peace, — all these may shape the connubial choice. But whatever choice is ultimately made, the marriage relationship anchors an *imu* more firmly to other social units, assuring the members of protection in war and personal crisis, of food and shelter when needed, and of a number of definite trading partners with whom one can exchange food, clothing and implements.

A moment ago mention was made of other reciprocity patterns in the Jahray world. Of these the so called *menake* relationship,—

involving two men, one of whom killed a victim during a headhunt, the other of whom actually took the victim's head, — is perhaps the most important. The *natu* relationship involves two sets of parents (and by implication their *imu*) one of which has adopted a child of the other. The adoption itself may be as much motivated by a desire to extend relationship bonds, with the child acting as a sort of pawn, as by economic or other considerations. A *natu* relationship enables one to use one partner's lands, it allows a boy in one family to regard a girl in the other as his "exchange sister," i.e. permits him to persuade her to marry a man in the family from which he himself is getting his bride, and it strenghtens one's social position generally in the men's or women's houses. *Natu* children may not marry with each other. Then there is the *nakaeri* relationship which is concluded between a headhunter and his wife on the one hand, and the person to whom the lower jaw of the head has been given and his wife on the other. A pattern of mutual assistance is hereby established between the two families.

There are also lesser relationships, such as between two men who take each other's name, between two pairs of parents who give each other the right to name a child after each other, and between two men or two women who have been born on the same day. Mutual aid to some degree is the expression of such bonds. Finally, there is the so called *kaki* pattern. Relatives who live in separate settlements or villages call each other *kaki*. They not only form a link between villages as such, joining together for assistance to go on a headhunt, but they also serve as distant havens to the individual Jahray, who can count on food and shelter with his *kaki* when away from home.

The cultural focus of the Jahray is the headhunt and its attendant rituals, and of these Boelaars has given an excellent description. An analysis of the technique and the cultural significance of the headhunt reveals many similarities with the headhunt as it used to be practiced by the neighboring Marind Anim, as described by Vertenten (Vertenten 1923: 45-73; van der Kroef 1952: 221-235). The reasons for the hunt are many and some are more apparent than others. As among the Marind it is customary that the Jahray child have a "head" name, i.e. the name of some person whose head has been taken by a Jahray hunter; without such a name the child is socially unworthy. A

head also serves to sanctify a marriage. After the hunt, and as part of the ceremonies following the hunt, a marriage feast is staged, during which a new groom gives a head, obtained by him in the hunt, lying in a basket to his bride. The bride hangs head and basket over her arm and dances round and round till exhausted (an identical procedure, incidentally, was also traditional in the marriage ceremony of certain Dayas of inland Borneo). It should be stressed that an informal marriage arrangement, permitting sexual relations, can be concluded before such a head feast, but only the transfer of the head between newly-weds legalizes their union.

Another important incentive for the headhunt is that it provides an opportunity to establish one of the most important reciprocity mechanisms in Jahray society, the so called *menake* and *nakaeri* relationships. The latter has already been described above. The former involves a relationship that has come about in the field of battle. The Jahray hunter who inflicts the mortal blow on his victim may leave to another the job of severing the victim's head from the body, in which case an important relationship, *menake*, springs up. The child of the hunter who killed the victim will be initiated at the headfeast and given the headname by the fellow hunter who actually cut off the victim's head. Henceforth, the two hunters are like brothers, their children are considered as siblings and marriage between them is forbidden. Extensive mutual aid between the two *menake* families is the rule. Such *menake* relationships can be maintained with more than one family.

Yet, significant as these reasons are, they do not tell the whole story. Women insist that headhunts are periodically held not only so that children may acquire the needed headname, but also that women may bask in the battlefield glory of their husbands. Widows cannot, in fact, end their period of mourning nor remarry until a headfeast has been held. Young children "practice" the hunt and absorb the significance of hunt in their games. Adult males look upon the hunt as the means of attaining great prestige, for the community awards badges of honor (e.g. necklaces of pig's teeth) to the audacious hunter. The hunt also ties different settlements together, and leads to a sense of massive united effort with others. All this gives perspective to the socio-psychological significance of the hunt for the Jahray: it is the

approved means by which he displays his personal strength and abilities. Indeed, according to Boelaars, the Jahray "does not go headhunting in order to get, but in order to show vital powers."

To see (as Boelaars has essentially done) the Jahray headhunt in terms of the individual's reenactment of the cosmic struggle between contending forces of life and death, vitality and decay, so that the hunt is a means of affirming the continuity of life and of its powers, for the individual no less than for his group, is to offer something of a confirmation of the hypothesis relating to the origin of the headhunt in neighboring Indonesia developed by Downs (1955: 40-70).

The historic process of Western penetration in the Jahray region shows, initially, much of the same fitfulness and ignoring of central cultural values as in the Muju region. Lasting contacts were made in the 1930's by military patrols, Roman Catholic missionaries and, later, by the police; earlier the Jahray had sporadically come in touch with foreign hunters of paradise-birds. From the start Dutch policy was directed against the headhunt, and the "pacification" of the Jahray consisted in the first instance of containing the Jahray within their own traditional territory. But World War II interrupted further penetration and, as police and military controls decreased, there immediately came an upsurge of headhunting.

At that time there came into being a rhythm of accultural vacillation, which proved to be highly destructive of further Jahray development. With infrequent demonstrations of Dutch authority the Jahray learned to be compliant as the need arose, but for the rest persisted in his traditional ways, counting on the government's periodic amnesties. A conflict between younger and older generations became more and more pronounced, and even Christianized Jahray youth could be persuaded to go headhunting once again. At other times the young battled with the old. Through it all a few solitary government officials periodically attempted to promote regular village formation by ordering the breaking down of the men's houses, while the Indonesian teachers shocked Jahray propriety by insisting that both young boys and girls be seated side by side on the school benches, and the indigent Papuan police in Dutch service committed repulsive excesses on recalcitrant Jahray in jails and elsewhere.

Mission and government agreed on fundamentals of accul-

tural policy (e.g. stopping of the headhunt, promotion of "Western" style education, breaking down of the men's houses and encouraging nuclear family life in individual dwellings). They lacked the means to effect a decisive change in the total structure of Jahray culture, and the initial result was much the same as in the Muju region: the Jahray was "boxed in" between past and future, cut off from his traditional institutions on the one hand, and only inadequately guided toward the new world on the other.

Though beginning in 1947, with the appointment of a regular Indonesian *bestuursassistent* (government assistant) for the Jahray, greater focus and continuity was given to the stream of cultural changes, Jahray resistance continued. Again and again the headhunt was revived (women repeatedly urged the men on), and Christianized Jahray youths who refused to accompany their elders on a hunt were, as Boelaars put it, "trussed up like pigs and taken along."

The excesses of Papuan police and of some East Indonesian school teachers employed by the missions aggravated Jahray hostility. At one point Dutch authority acted with great repressive severity in stamping out the headhunt. When, therefore, in 1949 again a large headhunt was held the government assistant was of the opinion that the "rage" which had seized the Jahray could no longer be controlled and only corrective measures *after* the return from the hunt would be of any use. This view collided with sterner mission policy, and although in 1952 the Mappi area became a district in its own right with its own Dutch civil service officer, initially mission and government did not cooperate very closely, partially because the Dutch controleur believed in a "separation of Church and State." In subsequent years this cooperation improved. Mission schools began to increase, a post of nuns was established, and under mission auspices huge feasts were staged in which thousands of Jahray as well as their traditional enemies solemnly made peace and inaugurated the coming of a new era. Active police surveillance continued, but its excesses were curbed. Accultural policy was now to stress the active integration of the Jahray into the modern world under his own leaders. Several aspects of this integration process deserve mention in passing.

For one thing a determined attempt was made to restore the position of older communal leaders in the eyes of the young.

This was accomplished by giving recognition to those Jahray who were commonly regarded as interpreters and arbiters of tradition (i.e. the *akiak rade*), and by urging the young to collaborate with them. At the same time younger, Christianized Jahray were increasingly given a measure of village authority. Such traditions as were not deemed harmful (e.g. usages when receiving guests, the preparation of pork, the staging of festive communal meals) were freely permitted, and even traditional formulas might enter into Christian prayers. Important also was the fact that the Jahray was given some idea of the connection between means and ends in his rapidly changing world. A development plan got underway designed to raise commercial crops; trades and skills were taught especially as the construction of new buildings and villages required the services of craftsmen; and the money paid for such work could be exchanged for the new and much desired commodities, ranging from gardening tools to clothing, available from a Chinese store. A carefully controlled number of Jahray males were allowed to go to distant Western installations and become contract laborers.

Considerable flexibility has now also been extended to village formation policy. Though raising of pigs is not as important in Jahray culture as it is among the Muju, pork is a much desired delicacy and pig cultivation is therefore general among the Jahray. After initial prohibition the Jahray were permitted to raise pigs in the villages. In the new villages an attempt has been made to let relatives live in close proximity to each other in the same sections of the village, while each dwelling is inhabited by two related families, so that kinship and reciprocity patterns are given some recognition. But because it is realized that the Jahray is still powerfully drawn to the life in the forest his presence in the villages is made mandatory only on Saturday, Sunday and Monday, although school absenteeism is more actively combatted.

But grave problems remain, especially in the economic adjustment of the Jahray. For various lengths of time the average Jahray is compelled to live in the forest or move to distant installations to work as a contract laborer, because he cannot earn enough money by staying in his village. Subsistence needs are still almost entirely met by hunting and the cultivation of sago

and fruits, both of which are carried on at some distance in the forest. Only fishing, some kitchen gardening and raising of pigs can be done in or near the new government-sponsored settlements. The Jahray has developed a taste for the Western commodities, he also understands the need to labor in order to obtain the money with which to satisfy this taste. The differences in the labor process (he does not understand that different jobs have different rates of pay), the relationship between education and acquiring marketable skills, and the larger industrial and manufacturing context of the Western commodities which he sees the packet ships bring to his country — these he understands only dimly, if at all.

The Dutch government has made attempts to enlarge the wage employment opportunities for the Jahray, but there is a real question if these are adequate in terms of the developing demand. Experimental cultivation of commercial crops in special gardens is at best a distant promise, rather than a realized objective. Still, it is noteworthy that, despite the inadequacy of the economic adjustment, "cargo" expectations have remained undeveloped. Older Jahray have speculated on the possibility of procuring ancestral help in the economic process, some younger Jahray passed themselves off as "visionaries" (*eakobaka rade*) who could right the balance, but no Millenarian eruptions are on record and the principal manifestation of Messianism occurred among some of the East Indonesian teachers (one of whom declared himself to be St. Peter and had briefly an unsettling hold on his young charges).

Related to the economic problem is the schooling question. The first East Indonesian teachers were regarded primarily as social reformers whose presence facilitated an accelerating cultural revolution in the entire pattern of Jahray living. Intellectual training tended to lag as a result, and Boelaars admits that the quality of mission schooling will have to be improved. The question is, however, what the young Jahray, who in his fourteenth year now leaves the mission school, is going to do with his knowledge. If further contract labor in Western encampments and installations is permitted, the future growth of Jahray village life will be seriously impaired, due to the steady migration of the young Jahray away from home; if it is not

permitted, worthwhile employment at home will have to be found, but present development plans seem wholly inadequate. It is here that we begin to touch on the fundamental weakness of Dutch accultural policy in Jahray country. For Boelaars notes that it was impossible to combat the headhunt until the Jahray understood that the motives which led him to the headhunt (i.e. the display of his vital powers which assure the continuity of his family and his group) could also be satisfactorily expressed in terms of different cultural objectives, such as providing for wife and family by taking up wage labor, winning praise by helping in mission work or common village projects, trying to integrate generally in the new cultural order brought by government and Church. For the time being, it seems that the Jahray has become appreciably motivated by these new objectives and by the challenge and reward that they present. But the memory of the headhunt is far from gone, and while it may not be revived an anomic younger generation of Jahray, unable to express its vitality in meaningful work performance, may well have recourse to equally violent cultural mechanisms. It is not, as van Baal (1953 1: 250) has written, that "the available supply of laborers" constitutes "the bottleneck of the entire development of the island (i.e. New Guinea) in the economic sense," it is rather the supply of available labor in terms of employment and development opportunities that is the main problem of the future.

III

A comparison of Dutch policies in the Muju and Jahray regions should in the first instance be made in the light of the cultural focus of the two communities, i.e. the preoccupation with accumulating various commodities through the extensive pattern of trade and exchange (Muju), and the display of personal powers as a means to maintain individual status, family and group continuity through the headhunt (Jahray). With both of these foci, Dutch accultural methods came into collision:

1. In both areas the Dutch insisted on village formation based on the nuclear family. In both regions too, the Dutch (especially the missions), opposed polygynous marriage. Among the Muju the Dutch resorted to force in breaking down forest dwellings, among the Jahray they destroyed men's houses. The effects of

this policy were farreaching. Village formation adversely affected the forest centered Muju economy, and this in turn placed the Muju outside the traditional security giving mechanisms of his culture. For the Jahray living in a village was possible only so long as he might retain his cultural ideal of *ak jamambek* (to show vitality) within it. If no adequate employment opportunities existed in the village, and headhunting also was forbidden, the Jahray could find no way of satisfying his traditional cultural ambition.

2. The larger cultural context of Dutch economic and technological achievements was inadequately communicated both to the Muju and to the Jahray, so that a culturally meaningful relationship with the new economic order was prevented. Both in order to provide an explanation in traditional terms of the steady stream of Western commodities, and to recover his self-worth upon the realization of Western technological supremacy, did the Muju lend credence to Messianic preachings. It is important to stress here that such phenomena as "cargo" cults and Millenarian movements need not necessarily have their origin in an accultural crisis condition, and that the mechanics of Messianism (e.g. belief in returning ancestors or culture heroes who will bring sudden bounty) may be operative before the accultural process gets underway (Galis 1955: 139-147). But it does seem reasonable to suppose, however, that the materialistic culture focus of the Muju provided a significant structural setting for Messianic expectations. The principal reason why latent Messianic feelings among the Jahray have not become stronger lies, probably, in the Jahray culture focus itself. The headhunt is that focus, and as we have seen, the Jahray again and again went on such hunts, notwithstanding the strictures of government and mission. The hunt provides the Jahray with that with which extensive trade and accumulation of goods provides the Muju: a condition of satisfactory adjustment to cosmos and social order, marked by attainment of status.

3. Mission policy, though essentially directed toward a "revolution in values" before providing significant intellectual and technical training to the Muju and Jahray, lacked the organizational and coercive means to effect such a complete transformation, and as a result aggravated the tensions of the accultural process. From its own ideological standpoint the mission was

correct in insisting on the abolition of headhunting, polygyny, private judgments, men's houses and so on, nor can there be much question that by and large such objectives were also agreeable to civil policy. But in order to reach these objectives a massive, consistent, and "floodlike" accultural policy would have been necessary, requiring close cooperation between Church and State. Such a policy has never been inaugurated anywhere in West New Guinea, and not only because of the costs involved. Civil administrative principles are still permeated by the traditions of "indirect rule" and *printah alus* ("gentle pressure") as these enveloped Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Infrequent displays of severity (as e.g. the attempt of some officials to stamp out headhunting), were soon followed by more permissive tactics. Moreover, as has been noted Church and State did not always cooperate closely, particularly in such matters as combatting polygyny, and occasionally the missions vainly urged a much more forceful policy on the government. The consequence of all this was that, what has been termed elsewhere (van der Kroef 1957: 455), the "holistic" approach of the missions was nullified by the inadequacy of its implementation.

4. Finally, it may be observed that the accultural contact situation was framed wholly in an authoritarian fashion. In many cases initial accultural contact of any regularity was made by East Indonesian mission teachers and government assistants, i.e. themselves representatives of a highly status-conscious society, which had always looked upon the inhabitants of neighboring New Guinea as "lesser breeds without the law." The ethnocentricity of the missions and the enforcement of governmental acculturation objectives all heightened the authoritarian atmosphere. Where the Papuan himself assisted in bringing the novel cultural elements to his people it was usually in the role of a policeman in the colonial service, and the excesses perpetrated by some authority-obsessed Papuan policemen certainly did not facilitate the complex processes of cultural change. Then, too, the Dutch government imposed new power alignments upon reconstructed Papuan society, by creating, both in the Muju and the Jahray regions, the institution of village chiefs and other village executive officials. Certainly in the initial stages of the accultural contact these new village functionaries were appointed

more for their compliance to government policy than for their representative status in their communities. Thus all along the line one has the impression that the acculturation process in the Muju and Jahray country, as in the rest of West New Guinea, is a oneway street, with the Dutch authority and its ancillaries doing all the directing and giving, and the indigenous Papuan community having to do all the following and absorbing. Since the acculturation process got underway with any regularity in advance of the creation of a sizable group of Westernized Papuan leaders, who might conceivably have acted as buffers and conduits between the two cultural spheres, this authoritarian approach was probably inevitable. But colonial administrative experience is becoming only too familiar with the potential political dangers of such an approach. Nowadays, as one student of another West New Guinea culture has pointed out (van der Leeden 1956: 157), one frequently hears the Papuan use the phrase "*Permerintah jaitoe sebarang*" ("The government means arbitrariness"), as the disintegrating effects of an enforced accultural transition become more and more apparent.

Increasingly the West New Guinea Papuan lives in two worlds, and even though of the traditions of one of these two worlds, to use the late G. J. Held's (1947: 311) striking phrase, sometimes "only an embarrassed smile remains," the tensions of being caught between the centuries will permeate indigenous Papuan cultures far into the future. Whether improved accultural mechanisms can be devised to alleviate these sources of cultural conflict still remains to be seen.

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